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1. Introduction
The sessions of the conference of the parties (COP)
represent the most well-known negotiating venue on
climate change. Since COP1 in 1995, the COP has
been meeting every year under the auspices of the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (UNFCCC). Every year since 1995, it has
attracted thousands of diplomats and observers from
academia, industry, and non-governmental organiz-
ations. The only exception is 2020, when the session
of the COP was canceled due to the COVID-19 pan-
demic and its agenda moved to the 2021 session, an
important element to which we return.
For many years, the sessions of the COP received
attention mostly from stakeholders directly involved
in the negotiating process such as governments and
environmental organizations. However, as shown in
figure A.1 in the appendix, in recent times media
and public attention to the sessions of the COP
have increased substantially, in particular since the
2015 session of the COP in Paris. Such evolution
provides both upsides and downsides. Themost obvi-
ous upside is that interest by the media and con-
cerned citizens creates pressure on negotiators and
policymakers to increase ambition and show pro-
gress on all issues on the agenda. Media atten-
tion and pressure from environmental organizations
can arguably be very helpful to increase ambition,
as long as expectations are set reasonably. Over
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the last few years, climate change has become in
many countries one of the top policy issues (Lloyd’s
Register Foundation, and Gallup 2019), thanks in
part to Greta Thunberg, the climate strikes, and
the Friday for the Future and Extinction Rebellion
movements.
However, there is also an important downside, to
which we would like to draw attention, while at the
same time providing suggestions for potential solu-
tions. This important downside is that, in presence
of high media coverage and high expectations from
the general public, disagreement on technical issues,
which may legitimately take years to be addressed,
may come across as evidence of failing international
cooperation on climate change mitigation. As a res-
ult, this focus on technical issues may lead to a lack
of momentum in climate negotiations, which can
be detrimental to the ultimate goal of increasing
ambition.
Indeed, only every few years the sessions of the
COP focus directly on the need for countries to set
more ambitious goals. While the ultimate objective of
climate negotiations is always to work on closing the
gap between current emissions goals and the need to
prevent dangerous interferences with the climate sys-
tem, very often delegates meet at the sessions of the
COP to discuss mostly technical details. That was the
case for both COP24 in Katowice in 2018 and COP25
in Madrid in 2019 (Schneider et al 2019).
The UNFCCC bases its decisions on unanim-
ity rules. Requiring all countries to agree on climate
policies imposes a very high bar. Climate change mit-
igation is a global public good, prone to potential free
riding, and with important heterogeneity in domestic
preferences for climate action, costs of achieving
emissions reductions, and expected damages fromcli-
mate change. Hence, reaching consensus on com-
plex technical issues can take time, without neces-
sarily having substantial implications for the core
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challenge of tackling climate change. For the latter,
setting ambitious targets at the country level, and ful-
filling them, are the most important elements, for
which the bottom-up approach implemented in the
COP’s session of 2015 gives countries some flexibility,
thus relaxing the strict constraint of unanimously
agreeing on one-size-fits-all measures (another point
to which we return).
Our main argument is that the combination of
very high interest by the media and concerned cit-
izens, very high expectations, and a narrow focus on
a few selected items on the agenda of climate negoti-
ations, especially technical issues, may lead to a per-
sistent perception of failure beyond what is justified
by actual progress by negotiators and policymakers
under the rules by which they operate. In turn, such
widespread perception can weaken the potential to
rally countries towards more ambitious goals and to
isolate recalcitrant countries through ‘naming and
shaming’. It can also create perverse incentives for
recalcitrant countries to generate evenmore disagree-
ment on technical issues, to give the impression that
international cooperation on climate change mitiga-
tion is generally failing, and to potentially lead climate
action to lose momentum. The 2019 session of the
COP is a good case in point. In 2019, media atten-
tion and expectations were so high that, at its end,
COP25 was considered by commentators as a fail-
ure (see Streck 2020 for a representative example),
despite the technical nature of the negotiations that
were not completed during the session, and the very
important progress achieved in other areas during the
year, including the pledge by an important number
of countries to reach net zero by 2050, or the launch
of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Climate
Action.
In our opinion, in the current context downsides
from high expectations and high media coverage are
starting to exceed upsides, absent any adjustment.We
suggest the following potential solutions, which in
part build on the experimentation with remote inter-
actions that the COVID-19 pandemic has allowed.
First, technical issues may be discussed in less pub-
lic and more regular events, leveraging the ability of
negotiators to join remotely. Second, club approaches
can be used to bypass the deadlock caused by unan-
imity rules, in particular concerning technical issues,
and potentially also to fast track negotiations. Club
approaches can facilitate progress, can provide sig-
nals of cooperation when unanimous agreements
are hard to reach so to maintain momentum, and
can represent credible alternatives to unanimity to
reduce the incentives of recalcitrant countries to delay
unanimous agreements. Third, United Nations lead-
ers, and influential environmentalists, can try to set
expectations consistently with the functioning of the
COP and manage them accordingly, paying attention
to both areas in which progress is made, including
through club approaches, and areas facing gridlocks.
The role of ambition is crucial at COP26 and no nego-
tiation on technical issues, no matter how import-
ant, should distract negotiators, policymakers, and
observers alike from the task at hand, which is build-
ing on the current momentum and strengthen and
homogenize country pledges.
The remainder of the paper is organized as fol-
lows. Section 2 describes in detail the main issue ana-
lyzed in this paper. Section 3 provides some sugges-
tions for potential solutions. Section 4 concludes.
2. The issue: unanimity rules and high
expectations andmedia coverage
Unanimity rules apply to all international agree-
ments, since countries are sovereign, they have the
right of political self-determination, are equal on a
legal basis, and are free to handle their domestic
affairs without external intervention, which are the
basis of what is known as the Westphalian system. In
the case of global public goods such as climate change
mitigation, unanimity rules following from theWest-
phalian system make progress on international cli-
mate negotiations harder to achieve, thus creating the
‘Westphalian dilemma’ (Nordhaus 2015).
Already when defining countries’ ambition levels,
climate negotiations had to introduce some flexibil-
ity to achieve success, as done with the Paris Agree-
ment. The bottom-up approach implemented in the
session of the COP of 2015 introduced flexibility
in international climate negotiations, by leaving to
countries to determine how ambitious they want
to be in their emissions goals or pledges (technic-
ally known as Nationally Determined Contributions,
NDCs), depending also on internal and external pres-
sure. That is, this solution leaves to countries the
decision over individual effort levels, which contrib-
utes to relax the constraint of unanimously agree-
ing on one-size-fits-all measures. This bottom-up
approach largely relies on domestic actors pressur-
ing governments to make ambitious pledges. It also
relies on citizens and governments feeling that other
countries are also doing their part, which is how con-
ditional cooperation works (Carattini et al 2019b).
So far, this system has been working relatively well.
The emissions pledges in the Paris Agreement, when
summed up, are expected to lead to emissions reduc-
tions able to keep temperature increases within 3 ◦C
above pre-industrial levels, which is supposed to only
be a starting point, as through the ratcheting mech-
anism countries are expected to update their pledges
at regular intervals, constantly increasing their ambi-
tion and their domestic efforts to decarbonize. Many
countries have already done so, a point to which we
return.
The approach that led to the Paris Agreement
has, however, left some gaps, in the form of tech-
nical aspects to be sorted over the first years of the
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agreement. Unanimity is, in principle, required to
deal with these complex technical aspects.
In this piece, we argue that the combination
of very technical issues, high media exposure and
expectations from the general public, and unan-
imity rules is very detrimental to climate coopera-
tion. The main reason is that it is relatively easy for
countries opposed to climate change mitigation to
delay action and prevent agreement on such tech-
nical issues, especially when there are already many
legitimate concerns, for instance related to the integ-
rity of carbon trading mechanisms. Several countries
took a minority stance and opposed an agreement
on the use of Internationally Transferable Mitigation
Outcomes (ITMOs) at COP25. A similar process had
happened the previous year at COP24.
Many technical issues being negotiated at the ses-
sions of the COP, such as on ITMOs, ultimately
do not directly determine levels of ambition, which
are what is most important, but rather how such
ambition is achieved, in particular in terms of cost-
effectiveness. Costs matter, because they affect house-
holds and, over the long run, potentially the ability
of governments to increase their pledges. However,
given that cost-effectiveness can also be influenced
through other measures not requiring international
consensus (e.g. through a wider adoption of carbon
pricing), the overbearing negative light shone on dis-
agreements over technical issues at the sessions of the
COP is likely counterproductive.
Despite the technical nature of many sessions of
the COP, media attention has steadily increased in
recent years. In 2019, very high media attention and
expectations led commentators to declare COP25 a
failure (see again Streck 2020 for a representative
example). Commentators came to such conclusion
despite the important number of countries, repres-
enting about 10%of global greenhouse gas emissions,
which had pledged a few weeks earlier to reach net
zero by 2050 and sent a clear signal to the rest of the
world, even when ambition was not going to be form-
ally on the agenda until the session of the COPof 2020
(now postponed to 2021).
Hence, given the relative importance, when com-
pared to setting ambition, of the technical issues
discussed at COP25, the major success of countries
opposing ambitious climate mitigation was not to fail
climate action, but to give the world the perception
that climate action was failing. We argue that such
perception may be problematic, in that it may lead to
a feeling of powerlessness and despair among the gen-
eral public, even when climate change has become a
top item on the policy agenda, arguably largely thanks
to increased pressure from citizens.
Further, such focus on technical issues may also
distract from progress in other areas, such as the
launch of the Coalition of Finance Ministers for Cli-
mate Action, which may play a very important role
in the long run in securing mitigation efforts from all
countries in the world, by mobilizing resources and
expanding the use of cost-effective solutions such as
carbon pricing, possibly in a coordinated fashion. It
is noteworthy that this World-Bank-led initiative fol-
lows a club approach, with some 50 countries par-
ticipating, representing about 30% of global gross
domestic product.
3. Some suggestions for potential
solutions: more frequent and less public
interactions on technical issues, club
approaches, and expectationmanagement
Some important lessons follow from this experience,
which could be addressed in the moment of reflec-
tion created by the ongoing pandemic. To be clear,
the coronavirus is no good news for climate change
mitigation. Even during ‘normal’ recessions, climate
change drops in importance among the general pub-
lic (Kahn and Kotchen 2011).
At the same time, however, the coronavirus offers
a window of opportunity to climate negotiators to
figure out the next steps and try new approaches.
The absence of a session of the COP in 2020
gives negotiators additional time to address tech-
nical issues behind the scenes, including through club
approaches. COP26will focus on ambition, for which
high media exposure and attention by the public are
important, if combined with plausible expectations.
With COP26 postponed by one year, policymakers
and negotiators have more time to act and prepare
accordingly. Governments should also be given extra
time to release their updated pledges or to revise the
ones that were released in the midst of the pandemic,
as it was the case with Japan (see Moisio et al 2020).
In the meantime, climate negotiators have time
to expand the use of alternative settings to work
out the differences across countries on most tech-
nical issues. Using a high-level event that attracts
enormous attention and happens only once a year
to negotiate over technical details that may require
continuous discussions may not be the best way to
proceed, and can also send misleading signals about
lack of progress on actual climate action. Potential
alternative settings include the Subsidiary Body for
Scientific and Technological Advice, where the talks
on ITMOs are currently taking place, as well as the
global and regional meetings of the World Economic
Forum. Most importantly, with these alternative set-
tings, meetings can also occur more frequently, espe-
cially given that they all moved online and may (at
least partly) remain online, andministers can bemore
flexible and participate whenever high-level decisions
are needed, with the goal of reaching agreements
by the following session of the COP. At the ses-
sion of the COP announcements could be made,
reporting either solutions relying on unanimous con-
sent, if present, or based on a club approach (see
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below). In terms of frequency ofmeetings, it is worth-
while noting that the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), the large United Nations
body tasked to condense in regular reports the sci-
entific evidence on climate change, has already exper-
imented with biweekly virtual, rather than biannual
face-to-face meetings, bringing on the same online
platform hundreds of researchers from all over the
world to write its 6th assessment report. Important
lessons may also be drawn, on both content and
the way of operating, from the Taskforce on Scaling
Voluntary Carbon Markets, launched by the United
Kingdom.
Club approaches can also reduce the incentive of
recalcitrant countries to try to hinder progress on
matters requiring unanimous support. Negotiations
on technical issues could drag for years, but incent-
ives to reach a compromisemay be stronger if recalcit-
rant countries knew that most other countries would
move on with temporary measures absent a unanim-
ous agreement, unless there is a specific need for a
uniform rule. Hence, club approaches could be used
to devise such alternative solutions (see Keohane and
Victor 2016). Those clubs would have like-minded
countries as members, along the lines of the meet-
ing called by French President Emmanuel Macron in
December 2017. Clubs should ideally also serve the
interests of the least developed countries and small
island developing states, as in the case of the Coalition
of Finance Ministers for Climate Action, whose goals
include a specific focus on developing countries, such
as the identification of measures to address the issue
of high cost of capital for adaptation and mitigation
investments in such countries.
Club approaches can be especially effective at
times in which global leadership may be lacking,
which was one of President Macron’s goals in organ-
izing a meeting of selected countries to signal their
continued commitment to climate change mitigation
despite the announcement by the United States to
withdraw from the Paris Agreement. Club approaches
can also provide signals of cooperation in periods in
which unanimity-based approaches may not. Addi-
tional clubs could emerge around carbon pricing,
which, coupled with border tariffs, has the potential
to lead to emissions reductions not only among the
club members but also among outsiders (Nordhaus
2015, Carattini et al 2019a). Club approaches can
also be used to fast track negotiations on items
requiring uniform rules, although success may only
be partial, as with the pre-COP25 meeting organ-
ized under the Costa Rican leadership and leading
to the San José Principles, a set of rules on ITMOs
to which 32 countries agreed. Switzerland and Peru,
for instance, recently entered into a bilateral agree-
ment for carbon offsetting in Peru to count as reduc-
tions for Switzerland under the Paris Agreement,
without double counting. The World Bank-led Cli-
mate Market Club has a similar aim. Alternatives to
unanimous consensus can help fast tracking negoti-
ations if they can reduce the incentive for recalcit-
rant countries to intentionally delay action to give
the world the impression that no cooperation can be
achieved on climate matters. The World Bank and
other entities active in realizing such initiatives could
play a crucial role in harnessing their potential and
ensure that these initiatives are perceived as credible
‘threats’ to inaction. While an excessive use of club
approaches may undermine the functioning of the
COP and lead to a fragmentation of climate negoti-
ations, we consider the risk of exceeding in the use of
club approaches rather remote at the moment.
With the two suggestions for potential solutions
that we just outlined, more frequent and less public
meetings and the intensification of club approaches,
many of the interrelated issues that influence ambi-
tion may be addressed in large part before COP26,
which could thus focus on increasing, and homo-
genizing, pledges. Given the current pandemic, poli-
cymakers around the world need to respond to the
urgent demands of their citizens. Resources and high-
level governmental attention are limited. Increasing
ambition is compatible with recovery programs and
so is carbon pricing, especially if it provides dividends
to citizens (see Carattini et al 2019a).
The third suggestion focuses on expectationman-
agement. United Nations leaders have now time
to work on their ability to manage expectations,
which may also include downplaying the import-
ance of some rounds of negotiations, when these
focus mostly on issues of technical nature. Countries
whose interest is in delaying climate action have all
the incentives to make sure that global citizens’ per-
ception is that of faltering cooperation and United
Nations leaders have the responsibility to manage
expectations and align perceptions with actual pro-
gress. While sessions of the COP also serve as ven-
ues for exchanging ideas and for networking, a more
austere and insulated setting may be more conducive
to actual progress when the focus of the negotiations
is represented by tedious and technical aspects of cli-
mate change mitigation. Currently the sessions of the
COP aim at achieving many goals, but there may be a
trade-off between breadth and the ability of reaching
such goals, including the core objective of advancing
climate negotiations. Moreover, when setting expect-
ations, it would also be useful for United Nations
leaders to expand efforts to communicate how much
has already been achieved with respect to business as
usual, and not only how much remains to be done.
The IPCC can offer again an example, with its out-
reach activities. Virtual forums allow the UNFCCC
to engagemore with stakeholders, to educate them on
the functioning of negotiations, to report on progress,
as well as to receive feedback.
Efforts by United Nations leaders to manage
expectations may not necessarily convince environ-
mentalists or the general public. Hence, influential
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environmentalists also have a role to play, and so do
seasoned commentators and academics, in particu-
lar in helping addressing information asymmetries.
For instance, influential environmentalists could get
more accustomed with the functioning of the ses-
sions of the COP, so to inform the general public
when stakes are high and when they are not. Influen-
tial environmentalists could also becomemore exper-
ienced at walking that thin line between putting pres-
sure on negotiators and policymakers to increase
ambition and making sure that immediate expecta-
tions are not unattainable, not to inadvertently play
in the hands of countries opposed to climate action.
Praising achievements by negotiators, and by govern-
ments on domestic action, can be as important as
reminding them that more needs to be done. Poli-
cymakers may not have strong incentives to act if
they feel that environmentalists are never happy and
that they would not be politically rewarded for their
actions. Further, environmentalists could try to chan-
nel their forces in strategic ways to further mobilize
voters in recalcitrant countries, including countries
with formal democratic institutions such as Australia
and Brazil.
At COP26, stakes will be very high, with the
expectation that most countries will have by then
communicated updated, more ambitious nationally
determined contributions (NDCs), providing the
first opportunity to gage global progress onnear-mid-
term climate actions through the NDCs and long-
term targets through net-zero announcements and
other mitigation strategies. Influential environment-
alists can play a crucial role in shifting attention to the
most relevant aspect of the international negotiations,
which is short-run and long-term ambition, rather
than technical issues, and contribute to the effective-
ness of the ‘naming and shaming’ process implicitly
included in the bottom-up approach introduced at
the session of the COP of 2015.
4. Conclusions
In 2015, the world witnessed the introduction of
a landmark climate agreement, the Paris Agree-
ment. With it, countries pledged to provide emis-
sions reductions that, taken together, would be able
to keep temperature increases within 3 ◦C above
pre-industrial levels. While environmentalists keep
reminding the public that 3 ◦C is way above the win-
dow provided by climate scientists to avoid severe cli-
mate damages, which is set between 1.5 ◦C and 2 ◦C,
we would consider 3 ◦C a rather important starting
point on which to build to narrow this gap, compared
with the alternative scenarios that were on the table
until a few years ago. Indeed, over the last few years,
the most pessimistic climate change scenarios (such
as SSP5-8.5 and SSP3-7.0) have become increasingly
less likely, while scenarios implying less interference
with the climate system (such as SSP4-6.0 or SSP2-
4.5) have become increasingly likely, an important
progress that we should not dismiss (Hausfather and
Peters 2020).
Further, during 2019 alone, 60 countries, as well
as the states of California and New York, pledged
to become carbon neutral by 2050. In 2020, China
pledged to become carbon neutral by 2060. These
pledges further contribute to reduce the gap with the
1.5 ◦C–2 ◦C goal. According to the Emissions Gap
Report 2020 by theUnitedNations Environment Pro-
gramme, ‘the growing number of countries that are
committing to net-zero emissions goals by around
mid-century is the most significant and encouraging
climate policy development’ (UNEP 2020, p 17). The
current pledges are only a starting point: countries
are expected to continue to regularly increase their
ambition. While some scholars are quick to stress
that pledges are not policies and that there is no
enforcement mechanism in the Paris Agreement (see
Harstad 2018 for a discussion), others, such as Car-
attini et al (2019b), Sakamoto and Karp (2019), and
Figueres (2020), stress the importance of maintaining
some degree of optimism, as it is a crucial ingredi-
ent for success in international climate negotiations.
As aptly described by Figueres (2020, p 471), ‘when
the Paris agreement was achieved, the optimism that
people felt about the future was palpable—but, in
fact, optimism had been the primary input.’
Hence, important progress on climate change
mitigation is currently being made. In this piece, we
argue that the combination of very high interest by
the media and concerned citizens, very high expect-
ations, and a narrow focus on technical issues for
which unanimous consensus is required may lead to
a persistent perception of failure beyond what is jus-
tified by actual progress by negotiators and policy-
makers.
As a result, we suggest three types of potential
solutions. First, more frequent and less public meet-
ings on technical issues. Second, an intensification of
the use of club approaches, not only to circumvent
gridlock but also to reduce the incentive for recal-
citrant countries to slow down negotiations on tech-
nical issues simply to provide the world with the per-
ception of faltering cooperation on climate change
mitigation. Third, better expectationmanagement, to
ensure that delays on technical issues are not com-
municated or perceived as general failures of interna-
tional cooperation.
Data availability statement
All data that support the findings of this study are
included within the article (and any supplementary
files).
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Appendix
Figure A.1. Attention to the sessions of the COP has kept increasing in recent years.
Note: number of attendees at the sessions of the COP by status: parties and observer states; observer organizations; media.
The number of attendees at the COP has massively increased over time, from a few thousands in the 1990s, when many
stakeholders would know each other personally, to around 10 000 in the following decade (with the exception of COP15 in
2009), and more than 20 000 in most recent years. The figure also shows that not all sessions of the COP are the same.
COP15 in Copenhagen, with 27 294 attendees, was expected to lead to a landmark agreement. COP21 in Paris too, and it
did. Such peaks in importance may, however, not be that well reflected in people’s attention or expectations, which may
reflect the divergence between the ‘climate emergency’ rhetoric and the need for climate negotiations to work in cycles.
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